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Abstract
Active labour market policy has gained emphasis in several OECD countries to promote 
efficient labour markets, and to combat rising unemployment. Consequently the question has 
gained interest, how to make these policies more effective. During the last ten years several 
attempts have been made to review the advances in the field of labour market policy 
evaluation. The paper gives an overview of the field, considering what steps could be taken, 
and what priorities could be assigned in the development of a rather comprehensive national 
evaluation practice.
It is argued that each of the different categories of labour market policy evaluation -  policy 
analysis, impact analysis, and implementation analysis -- should be taken seriously. Priority 
should be given especially to the development of implementation analysis: setting up sound 
monitoring systems and performance indicators must be considered as very important steps. 
Implementation evaluation has a close relationship to impact evaluation because appropriate 
structures of monitoring and performance indicators are a necessary precondition for impact 
studies.
Zusammenfassung
Aktive Arbeitsmarktpolitik hat in vielen OECD-Ländern an Bedeutung gewonnen, um die 
Funktionsweise der Arbeitsmärkte zu verbessern und die steigende Arbeitslosigkeit zu 
bekämpfen. Daher bekommt auch die Frage wachsende Bedeutung, wie diese Politik 
effektiver gemacht werden kann. Das Papier gibt einen Überblick über das Feld, und 
diskutiert welche Prioritätensetzungen und welche Schritte zu einer umfassenden 
Evaluationspraxis führen können.
Es wird gezeigt, daß jede der verschiedenen Arten von Evaluation -- Politikanalyse, 
Wirkungsforschung und Implementationsforschung -- erstgenommen werden müssen. Der 
Entwicklung der Implementationsforschung sollte Priorität gegeben werden, wobei der 
Aufbau von guten Monitoring Systemen und von Wirkungsindikatoren wichtige Schritte 
darstellen. Zwischen der Implementationsanalyse und der Wirkungsanalyse besteht ein 
enger Zusammenhang, da geeignete Monitoring Systeme und Wirkungsindikatoren 
notwendige Voraussetzungen für das Verständnis der Wirkungen darstellen.
Note;
For helpful comments on earlier drafts of the paper I am indebted to Karl Pichelmann, Patricia 
Bartholomew, Andreas Wôrgôtter, and the participants at the OECD-Technical Workshop about 
Labour Market Policy in the Transition Countries, Vienna 1995.
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Introduction
Active labour market policy has gained emphasis in several OECD countries to promote efficient 
labour markets, and to combat rising unemployment. To some extent resources were shifted from 
passive income support to active measures, so that considerable resources -  on average almost one 
per cent of GDP -  are spent in this area. Consequently the question has gained interest, how to 
make these policies more effective.
During the last ten years several attempts have been made to review the advances in the field of 
labour market policy evaluation. Many issues have become clearer, and the scope of the questions 
asked has broadened. The following paper will give an overview of the field, considering what steps 
could be taken, and what priorities could be assigned in the development of a rather comprehensive 
national evaluation practice. Emphasis for labour market policy as well as evaluation experience 
varies considerably among countries: some show us well-established practices which had developed 
during decades, whereas other countries are lacking experience in this field. Consequently, we may 
take the former as examples for what can be achieved; however, the latter may show us some o f the 
hurdles which must be overcome to develop more sound practices. Therefore, this paper is taken 
partly from the perspective of a country where rather few exercises in labour market policy 
evaluation have actually been performed. It tries to outline what can be learned from past 
experience to apply to further development.
First different types of national frameworks for labour market policy evaluation are outlined, 
whereby the pros and cons o f different frameworks are discussed, and the question is posed which 
path should be followed in the course o f setting up a framework for national evaluation of labour 
market policy measures. Secondly the scope of labour market policy evaluation is outlined in some 
detail, arguing that the mainstream of evaluation practice covers a rather narrow scope o f the overall 
field. Different categories of evaluation are discussed with reference to the general evaluation 
literature as well as to some reviews of labour market policy evaluation. In the third section, the 
methodology o f labour market policy evaluation is considered, focusing on the experimental vs. 
non-experimental approach, micro vs. macro evaluation, kinds of implementation evaluation, and 
policy evaluation as the main topics.
1. National frameworks of labour market policy evaluation
As pointed out in the OECD-review of labour market policy evaluation activities from 1989, there 
have been major differences between countries concerning experience in this field. Some countries
evaluate virtually all important policies (Australia, Canada, U.K., U.S.); other countries -  at least 
for a decade previous — did not perform any evaluation (seven countries are listed in this category, 
including Japan and Italy); and some countries are lying in between the extremes: Germany and 
Sweden with a more developed evaluation practice; and six countries — including France, the 
Netherlands, and also Austria -  are rated to have carried out "evaluations o f varying degrees of 
sophistication on a sporadic basis" (OECD 1989, 49). However, as the policies o f the European 
Union require relatively comprehensive evaluation activities, a process o f further development of 
evaluation practice in the EU member states is going on; e.g., the measures co-flnanced by the 
European Structural Funds (ESF) include ex-ante evaluation, process-related monitoring and 
evaluation, and ex-post evaluation of impact. In addition, the building up of evaluation networks for 
a more systematic exchange of experience has been started.
In our considerations o f methodological issues, we should bear in mind the broad range o f practices 
in different countries, and think about possibilities for improvement in the countries that do not 
evaluate their policies. One issue of interest in this respect is the different institutional frameworks 
within which evaluation practice is performed in different countries.1 This point is a rather 
important one if  a country is planning to set up more comprehensive activities in the area o f labour 
market policy evaluation. Furthermore, it may be said that the institutional setting does also 
influence some aspects o f evaluation methodology.
Two broad "ideal-types" of different institutional frameworks are to be distinguished; with certain 
countries closely representing these "ideal-types" In the following figure some important 
characteristics o f the US and the Canadian evaluation frameworks are summarized (see figure 2).
Figure 2: Stylized Aspects of Institutional
THE UNITED STATES
* External evaluation
* broad market o f evaluators
* various procedures applied
* involvement of the academic community
* experimental methods
* publication and evaluation o f the results
* "scientific" interests
* inputs into the international discussion
Frameworks for Labour Market Policy Evaluation.
CANADA
* internal evaluation
* definite requirements for evaluation
* given set o f procedures
* broad systems generating routine data for
monitoring and performance indicators
* quasi-experimental methods
* not distributed to the public
* feedback to the evaluated institutions
1 To elaborate on this point, we can refer to the case studies about several countries (US, Canada, Sweden,
Germany, Australia, Netherlands, U.K.) which are presented in the OECD 1991 publication.
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Putting the emphasis on external, or on internal evaluation procedures, is an important design 
characteristic of a national evaluation framework. Craig Ridell (1991) has shown some 
consequences in his comparative analysis o f the U.S. and the Canadian evaluation experience. 
External evaluation means that evaluation activities are performed by personnel outside o f the 
labour market policy institutions. As a prerequisite o f this model a professional community of 
evaluators able to perform the projects must exist, which developed during three decades in the U.S. 
(Rossi & Wright 1984). This seems to be a rather long time, and to shorten this process in a certain 
country support from research policy will be necessary. As compared to the development of an 
internal system, the costs may be more distributed to various budgets in case of external 
professional development. Another feature o f the external-internal alternative concerns the links to 
the research system, which may easier be built up in external systems. Finally, the issue o f an 
informed public debate seems to be concerned also, because the internal system may rather tend to 
withhold from the public.
The question, whether evaluations have to be performed by a certain pattern o f procedures -  
including rules about questions to be answered, timing of projects, methodology to be applied, data 
to be collected, etc. — is another important characteristic o f the design of an evaluation system. 
Internal systems seem to develop this kind of regulation rather than external systems, allowing for 
an establishment o f standard procedures for evaluation, but possibly posing some constraints on the 
further development o f methodology.
At this general level, we may discuss some pros and cons of the two different ways of setting up a 
national evaluation framework. The US -  predominantly external -  model certainly has very much 
contributed to the improvement of impact analysis accuracy; however, for this model to be realized, 
a rather large community o f evaluators is required that may not easily to be developed in smaller 
countries; drawbacks o f the US model include undeveloped implementation procedures and 
unsatisfactory feedback mechanisms. The Canadian -  predominantly internal -  model certainly is a 
good way to develop monitoring mechanisms and performance indicators, and also to easily provide 
feedback about policy action. However, there may be a tendency of not looking at the full range of 
problems in the evaluated area, and because of the predominance o f internal communication 
channels also the evaluation of results may be restricted. From these considerations the following 
conclusion may be drawn: some aspects of both systems may be necessary for the development o f a 
comprehensive evaluation system; perhaps the Australian model may be considered as a 
combination of the two: it includes a quite comprehensive system of mandatory internal evaluation, 
with broad monitoring mechanisms, but also gives leeway for external evaluators to conduct 
projects in this framework.
Another feature of an evaluation framework is the establishment of mandatory requirements for the 
evaluation of certain policy actions. In several countries evaluation and monitoring is required by
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legislation, and this may be a way to accomplish the political will which is necessary for systematic 
evaluations to be conducted (OECD 1989, 50).2
If  we now take a short look at the experience of countries, which have not developed a full 
evaluation system, we can observe some typical problems in the process o f the development o f a 
well-established labour market policy evaluation practice. Bjorklund (1991) has pointed out that 
Sweden may be considered a case where the typical problem of a discrepancy between a large 
amount o f money invested in labour market policy measures and a fairly low level o f evaluation 
activities is particularly striking. In assessing the causes for this, beside others, an important point is 
mentioned: if  there are no institutions existing, which collect data to be used as a basis for 
evaluation studies, it is very difficult to develop evaluation practices. The costs o f projects that must 
collect their own data are relatively high; this holds especially if  a country’s population is small due 
to the fact that the relative sample size must also be larger in order to make the necessary 
breakdowns into subgroups. Therefore the creation of proper mechanisms for collecting and 
distributing data that can be used by an evaluation community seems to be a very important issue, 
which may be generalized to other small countries as well.3
In the Netherlands, an improvement of labour market policy evaluation was brought about at the 
beginning o f the eighties. However, a first attempt at a systematic approach within the 
administration was not very successful, first because the administrative data that were conceived as 
an information base proved to be unsatisfactory, and second because there was a lack o f qualified 
personnel to carry out the evaluations. Since 1985 a second wave of activities has been under way, 
and the interest in these activities has been rising because of steps to reorganize labour market 
policy: delivery of policy measures has been decentralized to various organizations. In this case 
evaluation has become an important issue for securing quality and efficiency o f the policy, and for 
accountability purposes as well. If we look at the more recent comprehensive review o f labour 
market policy evaluation in the Employment Outlook from 1993, we can see, that this new wave of 
activities has been successful; evaluation results from the Netherlands are represented in four out of 
seven categories o f labour market policy. However, the problems listed in the Netherlands case 
study from 1991 may be important for other countries that are trying to set up and develop proper 
activities in labour market policy evaluation. The main problems were:
— Policy objectives were not specified sufficiently
— Lack of attention to costs of policies
— Focus on direct effects and neglect of indirect effects
2 However, some researchers have also taken a critical position in the debates about the value o f  evaluation, 
which can be summarized by Wilensky's law: "The more evaluation, the less program development; the more 
demonstration projects, the less follow-through."(Wilensky 1985, 9; see also Riddell 1991, 49-50)
3 Making the information systems designed for the administration o f  social security available for programme 
monitoring and evaluation may be way to overcome this problem. In Austria important steps in this direction have been 
made during the last decade, with encouraging results; however, these data are rather difficult to handle and are lacking 
important information (see Pichelmann et al. 1991).
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-- Lack o f attention to core activities such as regular job-finding and training activities
-  Too little activity in ex-ante evaluation.4
Before trying to draw some conclusions for the design of a national framework, two additional 
aspects that are important for practical reasons must be mentioned. The first is the time frame for 
evaluation. It seems to be difficult to coordinate a policy cycle and a time frame of evaluation 
activities especially when the evaluation community is not very experienced. However there are 
also more objective trade-offs that can only partly be solved. One is that every practical experience 
needs time to evolve, however policy very often has to respond to very urgent needs, and therefore 
no time is left for acquisition of experience. Some general recommendations may be made 
concerning the problems of time frame: one is that evaluation exercises should be set up at the very 
beginning o f each programme; best through a thorough ex-ante evaluation (market exploration, 
problem analysis, and estimation o f desired and possible effects) and development o f useful 
monitoring procedures that ensure a regular flow of information about all important aspects o f a 
programme. Another general recommendation is pointing to continuity, not only in evaluation 
practice but also in policy development, which mainly means that actual plans should take into 
account past experience; although this seems to be an obvious statement, it is often not the case.
The second aspect, which is o f much practical importance, is the development o f personnel 
resources for the evaluation activities. This question refers to the internal vs. external model. 
However, in either case, human resources able to perform evaluations have to be developed; and 
according to the OECD-experience, the attitude in the policy environment seems to be a crucial 
factor: as pointed out in the 1991 paper "the key question" may be rather that "evaluation gives rise 
to an adequate and informed public debate" (OECD 1991, 15). This means that part of a national 
framework must include the existence o f interest in such a debate by the different actors and of an 
appropriate forum for discussion. In case o f Austria some studies show that these preconditions are 
not met to a high degree.5
2. The Scope of Labour Market Policy Evaluation
In this section we will point out that a rather narrow area of the overall scope o f labour market 
policy evaluation, namely impact analysis using quantitative methods, is fairly well developed, 
whereas we know little about many other areas. This argument is elaborated by looking at different
See de Koning & de Munnik 1991. p.146, p. 154.
5 The studies o f  Zilian & Malle (1993) have analyzed how the different actors on the labour market are dealing
with problems o f  mismatch, or free riding. They show in painstaking details as to how uninformed and contradictory 
the public debate about these issues is performed.
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aspects: (a) a comprehensive taxonomy of different areas o f evaluation; (b) distinct categories of 
labour market policy evaluation; (c) the dimensions o f policy actions in institutional terms.
a) Areas of Evaluation Activity in General, and Categories o f Labour Market policy evaluation.
If  we compare the mainstream of labour market policy evaluation with the more general evaluation 
literature, we can see a concentration on some specific questions and methods in the mainstream 
literature.6 Whereas in the general evaluation literature a continuous differentiation and broadening 
of research questions and methodological approaches has taken place, this broadening has not been 
reflected very much in the labour market policy evaluation field.
In the general evaluation literature, methodological development can be characterized by a twofold 
structure; the traditional approaches of quantitative impact analysis, and the mainly qualitative 
approaches o f formative evaluation. However, there are not many examples of evaluation activities 
in labour market policy from the second category.
We may illustrate the broad scope of general evaluation theory by a taxonomy developed by Huey- 
Tsy Chen (1990), who elaborated the theory-driven approach developed by Rossi. Compared to the 
classical approach o f impact analysis, two aspects are brought to the fore: the first is the definition 
of problems and of goals and objectives of actions. The second is the implementation of these 
actions. Both were not tackled with in the classical design: goals and objectives were treated as 
(externally) given, implementation was treated as a "black-box".
Chen distinguishes six broad areas of evaluation which when taken together build a comprehensive 
strategy of theory-driven evaluation:
1. Analysis o f  goals and objectives and their intended results
2. Analysis o f  treatment
3. Analysis o f  the implementation environment
4. Impact analysis I: quantitative (outcome oriented)
5. Impact analysis II: qualitative (process and implementation oriented)
6. Analysis o f  generalization.
These areas, which give a good overview about the different kinds o f objectives and research 
questions to be dealt with in the evaluation business, are briefly described in the Table below.
The OECD (1989) report about the main findings o f  the evaluation programme had defined evaluation 
conceptually by impact evaluation. Evaluation "usually seeks to establish in cost-beneflt terms the net effects in both  
financial an d  rea l econom ic terms.''{OECD  1989,44).
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Figure 1: Areas of Evaluation Activity (Taxonomy by Huey-Tsy Chen 1990)
]. Analysis o f  voals and objectives and their intended results
Task  Clarifying the goals and objectives Issues 
o f a policy. This area refers to the 
com plexity o f  the goals o f  many 
actions; and also to the fact that 
frequently, various actors are 
involved in a single activity. This is 
especially true for labour market 
policy, where goal conflicts between 
employers and employees 
frequently arise, e.g., concerning the 
equity-efficiency trade-off.
2. Analysis o f  treatment
TASK The analysis o f  the actions designed ISSUES 
to bring about the intended outcome 
should provide the necessary 
information to describe the most 
important aspects o f  treatment 
within an action. Any market policy  
measures -  as, e.g., training or 
employment subsidies — can be 
designed in various manners; 
moreover, one o f  the best 
established findings is that the 
practical delivery o f  policy 
measures tends to vary markedly 
among local agencies.
3. Analysis o f  the implementation environment
Task  A ll aspects in the environment o f  an ISSUES 
action that may be important with 
respect to implementation or to 
outcomes should be under 
consideration in this area. These 
dimensions should be also 
considered to be included into a 
monitoring system. The elements 
that link levels o f  formulation and 
delivery o f  an action that are 
frequently the weakest points o f  
implementation should be taken into 
account.
* Observation o f  different views taken upon an activity by 
different actors (e.g., to observe problems that inhibit 
cooperation between the actors, or to give an account o f  
fundamental goal conflicts between actors);
* to define the intended outcomes or to establish 
performance indicators;
* to find a consensus about priorities;
* to analyze the obtainability o f  certain goals or objectives;
* to identify goal conflicts or unintended outcomes.
* Description o f  the main components o f  the treatment (e.g., 
in case o f  training measures: duration o f  courses, 
composition o f  skill packages, specific targeting and 
screening procedures, learning sites, training methods, etc;
* distinction between conceptual plans for the treatment as 
opposed to the actually implemented treatment to find out 
whether the plans have been implemented properly;
* information for the design o f  a satisfactory monitoring 
system.
- Participants (e.g., persons to be served by a measure, 
target groups, etc.)
- Providers (e.g., persons involved in the delivery o f  a 
measure: employment service councelors, etc.)
- Characteristics o f  provision (e.g., information channels, 
selection procedures, etc.)
- Organizational frame o f  provision (e.g., links between 
participants and providers: mandatory visits at the 
employment service, entitlements, etc.)
- Organizational linkages (e.g., kind o f  relations between 
involved organizations: legal basis o f  relations between 
employment service, training organizations, and enterprises, 
etc.)
- Micro context o f  provision (e.g., families o f  participants, 
influence o f  peer-groups, etc.)
- Macro context o f  provision (e.g., regional characteristics, 
econom ic cycle, etc.)
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Figure 1 continued: Areas of Evaluation Activity (Taxonomy by Huey-Tsy Chen 1990)
4. Impact analysis I: quantitative C.outcome oriented)
Task This is the core area o f  evaluation ISSUES 
research especially in labour market 
policy evaluation. The main 
objective is to find out the effects o f  
an evaluated activity. To find out 
the benefits in financial terms, and 
to compare the benefits to the costs 
is the most advanced type o f  
quantitative impact analysis.
* Meeting internal validity  to identify the real net effects o f  
an activity;
* to identify the benefits o f  an activity in accurate terms;
* distinction between the intended outcomes and 
unintended consequences o f  an action;
* the methodological tools o f  impact analysis require 
definitions o f  goals that are frequently not fulfilled.
5. Impact analysis II: qualitative (process and implementation oriented)
TASK This second area o f  impact analysis 
is not included in the traditional 
"black-box" approaches. The main 
question here is whether program 
theory is appropriate: can the 
intended outcome be reached by the 
measure as it is conceived?
ISSUES * Distinction in program theory between conceptual theory 
(states the causal relationship that should bring about the 
efficacy o f  an intervention) and action theory (states the 
specific treatment that should put the stated causal 
relationship into working).
* Assessment, whether the action theory has shaped an 
appropriate treatment on the basis o f  the conceptual theory.
* Empirically observed differences in results may reflect 
differences in evaluation methods or differences concerning 
action theory.
6. Analysis o f  generalization
Task  In this area the problems o f  linkage Issues 
between the field o f  "research" and 
the field o f  "practice" is set up as a 
distinct area o f  evaluation activities.
Behind this lies the idea that explicit 
activities o f  "translation" between 
the two fields are necessary.
* All problems o f  feedback o f  evaluation results into 
practice are to be tackled in this area;
* to promote understandig each other among evaluators and 
users;
* to secure applicability o f  evaluation results;
* to preclude overgeneralization, or abuse o f  evaluation 
results.
The taxonomy makes clear that the quantitative outcome oriented impact analysis which is the core 
area of evaluation research especially in labour market policy evaluation should be supplemented by 
various other tasks and objectives. The methodological tools o f impact analysis require the 
identification of the benefits o f an activity in accurate terms. The necessary definitions o f goals are 
frequently not fulfilled. Therefore a close relationship should be considered between outcome 
oriented impact analysis and goal analysis. An important example which points to this connection 
concerns the goals and objectives of private-sector employment subsidies: Whereas measures o f this 
kind have been frequently designed for the creation o f additional employment, their main 
achievement may have been rather to improve the relative employment chances for disadvantaged 
groups (OECD 1988, 56-8). A broad literature has evolved around the topic of dealing with the 
relation of goals and effects, including the approach o f "goal-free" evaluation formulated by 
Michael Scriven (1972, 1973), which states that the evaluators should choose a set o f objective
measures out o f the universe o f possible outcomes; so it would be possible to analyze a broader set 
of objectives than those derived directly from the stated goals and objectives.7 Another notion 
concerning the definition o f goals is to draw a distinction between "official" and "operative" goals, 
or between "formal" and "real" ones. Taking up the example o f employment subsidies, it is 
obviously easier to promote publicly the goal of a net employment increase, rather than the more 
special objective o f improving the employment chances o f long-term unemployed persons at the 
expense o f short-term unemployed persons.8 Some other typical examples which refer to possible 
tensions between official goal statements and real impacts are: It may not be convenient in political 
terms to give much public emphasis to the objective o f wage moderation; the same holds for the 
objective of renewal o f benefits through the participation in a scheme. In any case, it is widely 
agreed that the goals and objectives are a critical aspect o f impact evaluation.
Qualitative, process- and implementation-oriented impact analysis is another important supplement 
to the traditional "black-box" approaches. It goes more deeply into the causes why a measure does 
not produce the intended outcome. If a certain treatment does not work, the reason may be that the 
action theory is wrong, or conceptual theory is wrong. Empirical studies about impact o f certain 
types of policy measures frequently observe a rather wide range of results, not seldom even pointing 
in different directions. Consequently the question arises whether the differences reflect differences 
in evaluation methods or differences concerning action theory. An example which may clarify the 
question o f conceptual theory vs. action theory can be found in the area of private sector 
employment subsidies, where experience has shown rather severe difficulties in influencing the 
personnel recruitment patterns o f private enterprises; however, it is not clear whether the difficulties 
are caused by some design features of the programmes, e.g., too low premiums, or whether there are 
more principal causes at work.
The taxonomy of evaluation activities by Chen works out distinct areas that give a comprehensive 
overview about the range o f different, but interlinked, objectives to be followed, and most o f other 
designs and approaches in the general evaluation literature fit very well into it. We could conceive 
evolution o f the overall evaluation field as a process of "enrichment", meaning that in each o f the 
above sketched areas various activities arise. Possibly the process of evolution of evaluation 
practices in a certain sector of a certain country may also follow a route which first brings about the 
involvement o f external evaluators, and later on will, through an interactive process, bring back the 
activity to the internal actors, which then are able to integrate evaluation into their every-day
The analysis o f  different effects o f  active labour market policies given by Calmfors (1994) may be seen as an 
example for goal-free evaluation, because the assessment o f  a broad range o f  possible effects is performed on a 
theoretical background, which is independent from the officially stated goals.
8 The possible difference o f  the officially stated goals to the real goals may be illustrated by an Austrian
programme o f  wage subsidies some years ago: whereas the official goal was "to create jobs", an evaluation o f  the 
operative goals showed clearly that the real goal was rather to redistribute unemployment by trying to influence the 
ranking o f  long-term unemployed in the queue o f  job seekers (Lassnigg et al. 1990).
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business.9 The professional character o f services and a decentralized system o f delivery o f the 
services may be seen as a precondition for such a development o f evaluation, conditions which may 
be reached also in the field o f labour market policy. In any case there should be a closer linkage 
between evaluation activities in different sectors o f society, because learning could take place 
between them.
The OECD (1991) paper about the state o f the art in labour market policy evaluation clearly stated 
that the traditional preoccupation with the observation o f the net-impact o f labour market policy 
programmes is not sufficient for practical purposes. Accordingly three different categories o f labour 
market policy evaluation were distinguished, which can be seen also as a simplified version o f the 
previously cited Chen-taxonomy: (1) policy evaluation, (2) impact evaluation, (3) implementation 
evaluation.
1. Policy evaluation. The first category, policy evaluation, refers to the analysis and discussion of 
the broader goals and objectives o f labour market policy in the general policy framework of a 
country in a certain situation. This kind of evaluation has proven to be necessary for at least two 
reasons. First, careful policy evaluation helps us to avoid too abstract and theoretical considerations, 
and guides us to a ground o f real possibilities; second, policy evaluation helps us to apply the 
necessary weight to the dimension of the goals and objectives o f policies or programmes. An 
important question is concerning reasonable expectations about the possible outcomes of a policy.10
2. Impact evaluation. The second category is impact evaluation which is the most developed 
category in labour market policy evaluation in terms o f methodology as well as in terms of 
accumulated experience. It aims at an accurate observation of the net-impacts o f policy measures 
(which means the actual impact compared to a situation where the measure in question would not 
have taken place). The impact may be measured by real indicators (e.g. reduction of unemployment, 
or the placement o f long-term-unemployed) or impact may be measured by financial indicators by 
ideally cost-benefit relations. Despite the most emphasis -  especially in the field o f methodology -  
has been given to this category of evaluation for several years, it is still not clear whether the most 
important problems have been adequately solved. The question remains open whether quasi- 
experimental methods are an adequate alternative to the classical experiment in defining the
An example where this general line can be observed is the development o f  evaluation activities in higher 
education systems. Even when evaluation activities have been started by external actors -- as, e.g., in the U.K. higher 
education system — frequently further development brings about a process during which internal mechanisms o f  
evaluation are set up.
10 As an example, there has been a long-standing discussion concerning the assessment o f  the strength o f  the 
stimulus in US educational programmes aiming at equality o f  opportunity. On the one hand the definition o f  what this 
aim means is difficult; on the other hand, even if  w e use the experimental approach to assess impact, we had to know  
previously how strong a stimulus is needed so that impacts can be expected. See for these discussions Mosteller & 
Moynihan 1972, especially Ch. 12 and Rossi, Freeman & Wright 1979, especially Ch.9. LaLonde (1995) also points out 
that the problem o f  reasonable expectations about possible impacts o f  training programmes has not always been taken 
into account sufficiently.
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"control” situation;11 and the other main methodological problems in impact analysis -  the 
assessment o f deadweight loss, o f substitution and displacement — have been seldom analyzed 
accurately.
3. Implementation evaluation. The third category, implementation evaluation, deals with all aspects 
o f program delivery and development. It is recently seen as the category that needs the most 
development; despite it is judged recently as being of equal importance as impact evaluation, its 
state o f the art is considered to be by far less developed than the latter (OECD 1991, 13) 
Implementation evaluation came to the fore, when certain shortcomings o f impact evaluation 
became clear. As impact evaluation was designed principally as "black-box"-model (which 
compared inputs to outputs, and observed, if  there was an effect or not), the results did not tell 
much, if  anything at all, about questions such as the following: why are there little or no effects? Is 
this due to the principal idea, or only to bad delivery? How to improve a policy measure? etc.
The described distinction between impact evaluation and implementation evaluation is related to a 
more principle distinction that was made in the evaluation literature between process-oriented or 
formative evaluation on the one hand and outcome-oriented and summative evaluation on the other. 
Some authors believe that the methodology to apply would differ deeply concerning these different 
kinds of evaluation: process evaluation is connected to qualitative methods, whereas outcome- 
oriented evaluation can hardly be done without quantitative methods; the latter can be performed by 
external evaluators, whereas in the former involvement of the internal actors and o f stakeholders is 
considered to be essential (cf. Guba & Lincoln 1987).
b) Policy Measures and Institutions
Another aspect where we can identify a narrow perspective in labour market policy evaluation is the 
dimension of the policy action that is analyzed. Here we can make a distinction between the 
measures o f active labour market policy and the institutional frameworks for bridging demand and 
supply on the labour market and for the delivery of measures as well (see figure 1).
This debate may be represented by some o f  the meanwhile "classic" articles: Burtless & Orr 1985, Heckman, 
Hotz & Dabos 1987, Bjorklund 1988.
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Figure 2: Analytical Structure of Labour Market Measures and Institutions
Demand Bridging Supply
M e a s u r e s
Public Sector Job Creation 
Private Sector W age Incentives 
Local Incentives
Adjustment Measures 
Measures for the Long-term 
Unemployed 
Transition from School to 
Work for Youth
Early Retirement 
Reduction o f  Working Time 
Training and Retraining 
Training to Remedy Gender 
Imbalances 
Geographic Mobility 
Assistance
INSTITUTIONS
Public Employment Services 
Decentralized Implementation 
o f  Measures
Source: OECD (1989)
The area o f bridging institutions had not often been subject to evaluation during the eighties. In 
addition "a surprising example of the failure to develop and use rather obvious monitoring data was 
uncovered by the panel on the Public Employment Service. It found that very few countries 
regularly collect and monitor job search times and job vacancy filling times, although these 
constitute prime evidence of the service's effort to improve the functioning of labour markets" 
(OECD 1989, 50).
However, since 1989 there have been major improvements in this respect. First, we have to mention 
the pioneering studies about the Canadian and the Swedish employment services (EIC 1989, 
Delander 1991). Second, during the last few years the OECD has begun to provide comprehensive 
and comparable descriptions and analyses of the public employment services of member countries 
(OECD 1993a, 1993b, OECD 1995a). Knowledge about different structures and practices o f the 
public employment service has substantially been widened. Probably the most important general 
finding of these exercises has been that the provision o f active labour market policy measures 
should be seen in the context of the more traditional activities provided by the public employment 
service: the links between mechanisms of payment of unemployment insurance benefits and 
registration procedures for the unemployment register; the practice o f notification o f vacancies, 
practices o f transition for the long-term unemployed between passive measures and active 
measures; etc.
Thus, labour market policy increasingly has been perceived as a comprehensive system rather than 
as a more occasional mix of single measures. This, however, seems to pose more open questions to 
evaluation practices than are solved by the new perspectives. More fundamentally, we may note that 
the methodology we have at hand is not very useful for the evaluation of institutions. Rather it has
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been developed for the analysis of single measures which are much smaller in scope and, therefore 
easier to analyze. Some projects, for example the evaluation of the Canadian Employment Service, 
have tried to evaluate this large scale institution by tackling it as a kind o f complex measure. The 
study that contains several substudies includes various designs and techniques o f data collection and 
analysis, as well as the definition and empirical application o f performance measures, and has 
obtained numerous descriptive and analytical information about the working o f the employment 
service. The generalized results point to rather disappointing issues, one being the observation, that 
the activity o f the public employment service did not contribute to the efficiency o f labour market 
operation, but rather enforces equity objectives, especially job satisfaction by served employees 
(EIC 1989, 8-11).
Looking at the development o f labour market policy we note that the institutional frameworks have 
come to the fore in several countries; there have also been complaints about the lack o f evaluation 
know-how in this field. In several countries the public employment services have been reformed, or 
are under a process of reform. An important issue o f reforms is decentralization. In that respect the 
1989 OECD study has also made rather general points claiming that results about the operation of 
reforms were not available up to that time.
If we take as an example the Austrian reform, the process of working out the reform plan was 
accompanied by a rather large scale evaluation project (BMAS 1992). For the first time a 
comprehensive analysis about the structure of the public employment service was carried out. It 
included an observation of the goals and objectives both of those imposed by the legal requirements 
and of those followed by the involved actors (especially the social partners); furthermore, a 
categorization of the activities carried out by the organization and the measurement of the average 
resources available for these activities (payment of insurance benefits, services to employers and 
employees respective to fill vacancies by placement offers, provision o f active labour market policy 
measures, etc.)was performed; and as a consequence of the analyses various recommendations to 
organizational refinements were made. A closer look at the study and its policy implications reveal 
some shortcomings that are pointing to more general developmental needs. First, the study was 
carried on by an external study group originating from another country, a fact which in turn caused 
inhibitions of the exchange o f information between the evaluators and the holders of "indigenous 
knowledge"12. Second, the study obtained measures about costs, but did not succeed in obtaining 
cost-benefit relations. Third, the process oriented observations revealed a great variability of 
virtually all indicators between the local offices of the employment service but the evaluators were 
not able to explain this finding. Finally some conclusions -  drawn from international experience -  
turned out to be rather neglected by subsequent practice.
The following points are indicating these inhibitions: Available research about the Austrian labour market 
policy is not fully considered; heavy informal critics in the organization undermine some o f  the obtained measures.
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The recent studies about reorganization o f labour market policy in various countries o f the European 
Community constitute an important step in the direction o f a more comprehensive evaluation of 
institutional aspects.13 The studies indicate a shift in paradigm towards reform of the institutional 
framework of policy as opposed to the past practice o f adding new measures to the existing ones or 
shifting emphasis from one measure to another.14 The Netherlands case study, for example, 
indicates the development o f "active networking" practices between decentralized actors instead of 
the attempt to centralized regulation and control of all activities. Again, we may infer from this kind 
o f evaluation exercises the importance of a closer look at the various aspects of implementation.
3. Methodological considerations in the different categories of labour market policy 
evaluation
a) Experimental vs. Non-experimental Methods - an Unended Quest in Impact Analysis
As pointed out previously, in impact analysis a main distinction has been made between 
experimental and non-experimental methods. In the experimental approach, the assignment of 
persons either to the experimental group, who are the clients o f a measure, or to the control group, 
who are not clients o f the measure, must be performed randomly. In this case observed differences 
in outcome between the experimental group and the control group ideally can be attributed as 
effects of the measure — or, if  there are no differences between the groups, the treatment would have 
proved to have no effect.
In the most widely used non-experimental approach, the treatment group is compared to one or 
more comparison groups that are matched from existing data bases. This methodology allows 
comparison o f the outcome-variables for the clients of a measure to the same variables for groups 
that bear similar characteristics. However, the main problem of matching the comparison groups 
remains; we do not know to what extent the groups are really similar, because of the existence of 
various unobserved characteristics, which could possibly cause differences in the outcome. The 
unobserved characteristics may culminate in a "selection bias", a set o f variables which influenced 
the initial enrollment of the clients in the measure, whereas the comparisons were not.15 This
See the studies about reorganization o f  labour market policies in Denmark (Hocker 1994), Germany (Linke 
1994), the U.K. (M osley & Degen 1994), and the Netherlands (Moraal 1994).
14 The former point is illustrated by the practice in the Netherlands, which was called "overproduction o f  
policies"  (Moraal 1994, 2); the latter is mentioned by Calmfors (1994, 34) in his discussion o f  a "balanced portfolio" o f  
labour market policies.
15 If the random assignment is performed properly, the problem o f  sample selection bias per definition cannot 
occur, because members o f  the treatment group and members o f  the control group must belong to the same population.
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problem is at the core of the current methodological and technical development in the non- 
experimental approach.
Since evaluation research reached its first peak during the US war against poverty in the sixties, 
there has been an ongoing discussion about the pros and cons o f experimental or non-experimental 
methodology. This debate may be seen as a kind of competition for the most appropriate 
methodology. Great emphasis was placed on social experimentation, especially since the first large- 
scale experiment, the New Jersey Income Maintenance Project, had been successfully performed in 
the beginning of the seventies. Parallel to the period o f development o f this kind o f social 
experimentation, however, important steps in nonexperimental evaluation occurred too. Probably 
the most influential book in evaluation research, Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs fo r  
Research by Campbell & Stanley published in 1963, made rather strong points for nonexperimental 
methods also.16 During the seventies the bulk of large scale experiments had been run. When their 
results were evaluated at the beginning of the eighties, heavy criticism arose. Hausman & Wise 
(1985) documented a comprehensive assessment o f these large-scale social experiments, drawing 
rather discouraging conclusions. Much of the criticism — apart from numerous weaknesses in 
design and analysis o f the social experiments, was directed at the wide range of questions which 
should have been answered by single experiments. Hausman & Wise (1985) therefore proposed to 
refute the attempt o f "doubling reality" in future experimental research. They suggested to perform 
simply designed micro experiments which should test a few treatment alternatives, using large 
sample sizes and less complicated models of analysis. At the same time when the large-scale 
experiments were in the stage of field work, attempts were made at developing non-experimental 
evaluation methods especially setting up databases for a generation o f non-random control groups 
used in the evaluation of the Comprehensive Education and Training Act (CETA). In the middle of 
the eighties, the experimental design proved to be rather successful in this competition o f evaluation 
approaches, in particular in the public and political arena. There have been several attempts by the 
advocates o f the non-experimental methodology to find techniques for ruling out the problems of 
sample selection. Nevertheless, despite some encouraging results, the Job Training Longitudinal 
Survey Research Advisory Panel recommended the experimental methodology for the evaluation of 
the impact o f Job Training Partnership Act in 1985. The OECD (1991) paper clearly stated that 
experimental methodology is the most reliable way to obtain impact results. Problems of 
interpretation of non-experimental results, and especially the well-known empirical test of 
experimental against non-experimental results by LaLonde & Maynard (1987) strongly supported 
this conclusion.
Shadish & Epstein (1987, 575) showed as a result o f  a survey in the US evaluation community, that this 
reference was the only one known by more than 90% o f  evaluators, more than three thirds reporting, that it had major 
influenced them.
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Reviews o f the various studies evaluating the impact o f the Comprehensive Education and Training 
Act (CETA) came to mixed conclusions. These projects were mostly using a non-experimental 
methodology. For example, Stromsdorfer (1987) showed that there were different results depending 
on the methodology chosen. The results ranged from significant negative to significant positive 
effects of training on income o f male participants. Additionally, different researchers arrived at 
different results observed by using the same data to analyze the same problem (Bryant & Rupp 
1987; Dickinson, Johnson & West 1987). However, for female participants the different studies 
showed similar results, namely significant positive effects. LaLonde & Maynard (1987) compared 
the outcomes o f experimental controls to the outcomes of nine different models o f matched 
comparisons for the same measures, using the same data base to evaluate the impact o f the National 
Supported Work Demonstration (NSWD) programme. The results in terms o f difference in income 
between the treatment group and the control viz. comparison groups in case of women, as well as in 
case of youth are striking: while the control group shows an income which is about 10 per cent 
higher than in the treatment group, the differences of mean income in the comparison groups range 
between zero and + 40 per cent compared to the treatment group. In the case o f women, one out of 
six versions o f comparison groups shows the same result as the experimental group; in three 
versions the difference is lower; in two versions it is higher. In case of youth the differences are 
even larger. As Stromsdorfer (1987, 389) points out, the described differences are due (1) to the 
construction o f the comparison group, and (2) to the specification of statistical models.
Not surprisingly, the advocates o f non-experimental methods have since claimed that their 
techniques are open for substantial improvement, and have criticized the above mentioned 
comparisons heavily: "All that LaLonde (1986), Fraker and Maynard (1984,1987) and LaLonde 
and Maynard (this issue) have shown is that selection bias is an important phenomenon in 
nonexperimental evaluations. The wide range o f  estimates produced from  their studies simply 
illustrate that false models produce poor estimates and that different false models produce different 
false e s t im a te s (Heckman, Hotz & Dabos 1987, 424) Heckman and his colleagues argued that the 
nonexperimental methodology could be substantially improved along two different routes, (1) the 
use of statistical and econometric techniques to rule out inappropriate models, and (2) the collection 
of better data for empirical analysis of the selection process. Moreover, an evaluation o f the Job 
Training Partnership Act (JTPA) would allow for important moves especially along the second 
route. The latter argument points to the close connection between impact evaluation and 
implementation, at least in the nonexperimental methodology: The more is known about the actual 
implementation o f selection procedures, the better models of the selection problem can be set up.17
At this point problems are arising in using administrative monitoring data for evaluation purposes, because this 
kind o f  data normally provides rather sparse information about implementation issues. Hofer & Pichelmann 1995 have 
rather successfully used Austrian data for the evaluation o f  a package o f  labour market policy measures aimed at rather 
severely deprived target groups. The following variables could be used for the modeling o f  the participation decision: 
age, gender, nationality, problem status, characteristics describing the career previous to the participation (as number o f  
unemployment spells, time out o f  labour force, etc.).
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The ongoing discussion has brought about several analyses and reviews which have considerably
18refined the arguments. Burtless (1995), in a recent discussion, stresses the point o f credibility of 
results for policy makers and the broader public as the most convincing point for an experimental 
design. Compared to an experiment nonexperimental methods would include rather strong basic 
assumptions, which are not so easy understandable by a non-specialist public; e.g., about the "right" 
equation representing the participation decision, and also about the most useful statistical models. 
However, the decision about which methodology to apply should take into account pragmatic 
considerations: "When the direct benefits from improved knowledge are easy to predict and 
measure, analysts can calculate the financial gains from improved decision making and compare 
them with the additional costs associated with conducting an experiment. An experiment should be 
undertaken when the value of the improved decision exceeds the extra costs o f the experiment 
(Burtless 1995, 82).
The advocates of nonexperimental evaluation have indeed developed important additional 
arguments to underscore their point o f view. Using information from the JTPA evaluation, 
Heckman & Smith (1995) make some points which show remarkable weaknesses o f the applied 
experimental methodology. In addition to the long-standing argument that black-box experiments 
about effects of treatment provide only limited information about the policy in question, they also 
argue that precise results are confined to mean outcomes, but cannot account for variability between 
persons. Moreover they provide empirical evidence for the existence o f both, randomization bias 
(the influence on participation by the randomization procedures), as well as substitution bias 
(participants in the control group gain access to similar treatments as the experimental group); and 
they show severe institutional constraints on proper design of the experiment (e.g., difficulties to 
find participants in the experiment at random, or programme administrators refusing to apply 
randomization properly). Overall, these limitations lead to the conclusion that the experiment 
cannot provide proper estimations of treatment outcomes compared to a situation without treatment, 
as it is promised by the experimental methodology.
This discussion will continue and we may be curious about the future technical improvements of the 
nonexperimental methodology. The 1991 OECD report stated clearly, that ethical obstacles -  
especially the point that a specific treatment has to be refused to persons who would need it — 
preclude the use of random experiments in many countries, "in fact, the technique is rarely used 
outside o f  the United States" (OECD 1991, 12). However, in many countries nonexperimental 
methodology is utilized.
See as a review Riddell 1991, or more recently the discussion in the spring 1995 issue o f  The Journal o f  
Economic Perspectives.
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b) Micro- and Macro-Evaluation.
In the course o f social experimentation development the scope o f interest has apparently shifted 
from the original emphasis on the generation o f knowledge about broad behavioural aspects o f the 
population (e.g. the attempts to test labour supply functions in the Negative Income Tax 
Experiments) to the mere observation of the impact of specific treatments. This shift makes it easier 
to conduct experiments; however, it also limits the generation o f new knowledge about behavioural 
aspects underlying the provision o f policy measures. Heckman & Smith (1995, p.86) suggest that 
the limitation o f questions to what works? vs. what does not work?, reflects a more general 
withdrawal from contributions to the cumulative body o f knowledge which would also include 
understanding why what works, works or does not. The contributions and discussions in the 
Hausman & Wise (1985) volume already referred to this question about the contribution o f the 
social experiments as opposed to knowledge from non-experimental studies, and their views were 
rather pessimistic.
In any case, the more general questions in labour market policy evaluation which transcend the 
immediate concern about the functioning of programmes, have seldom been treated within the 
experimental studies. Moreover, most past evaluations are confined to the micro level o f results for 
participants. Two somewhat different, but conceptually linked courses of study which go further 
than the questions at the micro level may be distinguished. One deals with the more immediate 
effects of policy measures on non-participants, especially substitution and displacement 
mechanisms; the second is more concerned with overall macroeconomic effects o f active labour 
market policy.
The latter has recently gained interest; however, the existing analyses unanimously concede that 
there is much left to do in this field. In a recent review, it is stated that "a fu ll assessment o f  the 
macroeconomic impact o f  active labour market policies is hindered by a lack o f  data and the 
difficulty in establishing robust causal links between the policies and labour market outcomes" 
(OECD 1993, ix). Calmfors (1994) has worked out a comprehensive account o f different effects of 
active labour market policies.19 Macroeconomic effects may arise by an increase o f the efficiency of 
matching between demand and supply on the labour market or by reducing wage pressures by 
bridging the gap between "insiders" and "outsiders". Furthermore, the productivity o f the work 
force may be increased by training activities, thus contributing to the competitiveness o f an 
economy and possibly increasing employment and wages. The effective supply o f labour may be 
maintained by reducing the risk of long-term unemployment and a subsequent harm to human 
resources. However, there is also concern that especially job creation measures and employment
See as discussion o f  macroeconomic effects also Layard 1986, Layard, Nickell & Jackman 1991, OECD 1993, 
Jackman 1995.
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subsidies may create a mere substitution or displacement of "regular" employment by subsidized 
employment. Another concern is that there may be only "cosmetic effects" o f reclassifying 
unemployed persons as scheme participants; a mechanism possibly reinforced by adverse incentive 
effects of participation in an active labour market policy measure.
A closer discussion o f methodological problems in this area would exceed the scope of this paper.
Yet, a general problem in this respect is the question of causality. The provision of active measures,
and consequently changes in expenditure can reflect changes in labour market performance as well
as it can influence labour market performance. Problems of substitution and displacement have also
been analyzed to some extent in micro-studies. Mostly the evidence is based on more or less direct
questions posed to enterprises, regarding how the availability o f measures would have influenced
their activities. Studies which report results on these aspects indicate that substitution and
20displacement seem to be rather high.
If  we look at the recent attempts to assess macroeconomic aspects of the problem, we may note that 
these analyses are establishing closer links between questions o f impact evaluation and questions of 
the other categories o f labour market policy evaluation, namely to policy evaluation. When the 
overall employment effects o f an active labour market policy (or effects on wage formation) are 
evaluated, the underlying aims and objectives are directly involved. Consequently, the findings may 
serve as important inputs in the discussion about reasonable objectives. The discussion of the 
insurance function of active labour market policy measures by Jackman (1995) provides an 
interesting example in that respect. He states that in addition to their intended direct effects, the 
programmes of labour market policy could also be used to deal with the problems of moral hazard 
in unemployment benefits. If participation in a measure after a period o f unemployment were 
required for entitlement to further benefit, this may influence claimants who are able to find a job to 
prefer this to the participation in a programme — or as Jackman puts it, the required participation in 
a scheme "can replace administrative selection by self-selection ... The disincentive effects o f  the 
benefit system would be countered, while the insurance objective would be safeguarded" (Jackman 
1995, p.12).
Moreover, the macroeconomic analyses recently have also begun to establish closer links to general 
questions of implementation evaluation. As an example, we can refer to the problem of the scale of 
labour market policy measures, either in terms of expenditure or of number of participants: wage 
equations have been estimated to test the effect o f number of programme participants and average 
cost of participants on wage formation indicating that both variables may have wage moderating 
impacts (OECD 1993c, 52). Another example is the question of interactive impacts o f specific 
programmes (i.e. training) and functions of the public employment service on overall employment 
effects, or effects of the amount o f long-term unemployment on the impact o f labour market policy.
See OECD 1993, 63-64, Breen & Halpin 1989, de Koning et al. 1992.
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More evidence regarding these aspects may inform us substantially about the most effective 
implementation o f labour market policy measures.
c) How to Improve Methodological Standards in Implementation Evaluation?
Implementation evaluation deals with the various aspects of the delivery o f programmes, or in other 
words, with the working patterns and mechanisms of institutions implementing the programme. In 
this category methodological paradigms similar to impact evaluation paradigms have not been 
developed. Perhaps development will not be possible. The range o f questions and perspectives, as 
well as the range of disciplines and methods is very broad, and the scientific paradigm o f evaluation 
is to a large extent ruled out by a professional paradigm of improvement o f practices.
The core objective o f implementation evaluation is provision of an accurate account of the measures 
in question. This includes description of all important aspects of treatment, the analysis o f the 
implementation environment, and finally feedback and generalization. In addition, two more 
general questions may be identified in implementation evaluation, one is whether the planned 
actions are to be considered appropriate for meeting the goals and objectives. The second is whether 
the realized actions are in accordance with the planned actions.
The OECD has proposed a distinction o f three types of implementation evaluation:
- monitoring,
- performance indicators,
- in-depth implementation analysis.
Monitoring means to set up a descriptive database about the delivery of measures, e.g. parameters of 
the measure, recruitment and participation, costs, survival or drop out-rates, post programme 
performance;
performance indicators mean that some of the descriptive data are related to the targets o f the 
measure, giving some information about success;
in-depth implementation analysis means mainly that some kind o f qualitative assessment of 
programme infrastructure is carried out. As there is the problem that using performance indicators 
as management instrument may cause adverse or non intended effects on the practice, this kind of 
qualitative analysis is very important.
Apart from the assessment of the impact of measures, the implementation of regular monitoring 
procedures has formed another root o f development of evaluation activities. According to the 
OECD (1989) report monitoring should primarily provide the necessary information to operational 
managers in order that they can achieve better management and control. Monitoring activities are
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seen as relatively separate from evaluation, the latter being designed mainly to inform major policy 
decisions. However, the necessary management information corresponds closely to the management 
style within an organization. The style in traditional administration requires different kinds of 
information than the management-by-objectives style. Whereas the traditional style is primarily 
input-related, the latter is — or at least should be — output-related. If we suppose that during the last 
decades a modernization process has taken place in administrative style, this process should have 
been accompanied by a process o f improvement o f monitoring procedures.
The case studies about different national evaluation systems indicate that there is a positive 
correlation between the decentralized provision o f policies, mandatory requirements for periodic 
evaluation exercises, and the set up o f sound monitoring systems. Australia, as an example, operates 
a programme monitoring system (Programme Administration and Statistical System) which 
provides computerized information on the basis o f unit record data o f programme placements. The 
information system contains the following information (OECD 1991, 142-3):
- Administrative details (e.g. geographic location, programme category, commencement and 
termination dates);
- Participant characteristics (e.g. date o f birth, gender, educational attainment, duration of 
unemployment, identified disadvantage);
- Placement details (e.g. employer/ training provider, industry, occupational details);
- Adjunct: Post programme monitoring survey about labour market status three months after 
programme termination (this adjunct is not operated for all programmes).
Probably in most countries most of these data are collected and registered somewhere, however the 
question remains, whether this information is used, and after all whether it is organized in a manner 
that can be used.
There are indeed indications that traditional administrative information systems do actually not 
provide the data which are necessary for an assessment of the ongoing practices. The Netherlands 
reported that a first wave of evaluation activities failed, apart from other reasons because of 
"defective registration and information systems" (de Koning & de Munnik 1991, p. 152). In Austria, 
despite the existence of a large and comprehensive information processing system, it is also difficult 
to use these data for generating aggregate information about a certain programme because the 
necessary procedures do not exist. The periodic information which is published about labour market 
policy measures also is not even sufficient to answer the simple evaluative questions which would 
exceed the most simple descriptive information about how many participants have been enrolled in 
raw categories o f measures. There does not exist for example a meaningful classification of training 
programmes, despite the fact that these have been the most important activities for more than a 
decade. We can argue that in many countries much is to be done in the case of the setting up of 
proper monitoring systems.
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If we take into account that the decentralized provision o f measures is one o f the dominant 
developments in labour market policy, and that furthermore an improved coordination o f the 
different aspects of policy -  e.g., the regulations concerning unemployment insurance and the 
design of active measures -  is an important factor for efficiency, then we must conclude that 
sufficient information about the working of the system, and therefore the development of proper 
monitoring frameworks will be one o f the crucial points for future development.
The next step in implementation evaluation is the definition o f performance indicators, which link 
the descriptive monitoring information to the stated goals and objectives. We can once again refer 
to the Australian evaluation framework, where the prescribed evaluation cycle for new programmes 
or pilot programmes from the beginning involves the definition of objectives preferably in 
objectively measurable terms, of which appropriate performance indicators are derived. These 
indicators are part o f a formal evaluation, and the information necessary to obtain the performance 
indicators is also included in the management information system about the programme. We have 
recently observed many efforts to develop and to obtain monitoring procedures and performance 
indicators also on the regular activities o f placement and counseling by the employment service. 
Hence, the above mentioned lack of attention to these activities -  as opposed to the high attention 
given to the active measures in the past — may soon be overcome. Change in the administrative 
style (which is frequently reported changing towards management-by-objectives) in fact requires 
some sets of performance indicators. Sweden is a country which has a rather long experience in this 
respect. Since the seventies, a management-information system has been developed which provides 
monthly information of the following kind for all units o f the employment service:
— Number and characteristics o f filled vacancies;
— Job-search- and vacancy-filling duration;
— Development o f long-term unemployment;
-- Number and characteristics o f programme participants;
— Duration o f participants' waiting for the beginning of a programme;
— Outcome of programmes with respect to labour market status.
Budgetary allocations were allotted according to the indicators, and some years ago some output 
indicators were utilized to adjust partly the financing of the operating units. Indicators like the 
following have been used for this purpose:
— Percentage o f clients who leave the register for work;
— Duration on the register before leaving the register for work or a scheme;
— Duration o f vacancies
— Percentage o f vacancies with at least one proposal for filling it.
Obviously the imposition o f a new overall system of performance indicators has practical 
consequences for the institution and is bound to change the working o f the system significantly. As
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a consequence, attempts in this direction can cause many rumours, and may take a very long time to
21be set in action. Although many countries have taken minor steps to management-by-objectives 
and decentralization reforms, sufficient information to learn from other countries’ experience is not 
available -- and, we perhaps can add, that such kind of information, even if it is available, often may 
not be used because of other political priorities.
These considerations lead us to our next category, in-depth implementation analysis. This kind o f 
analysis received little attention in the OECD (1989) report. One reason may be that the source of 
information was the work conducted by panels consisting mainly of country officials. Members of 
the administration likely take the view that planned measures at least in principle are implemented 
accurately. They certainly know that there are shortcomings, however they will operate on the 
hypothesis that on average the delivery is in accord to the rules and regulations. However, as 
pointed out above, only two years later implementation analysis was regarded to be equal in 
importance to impact analysis: The OECD 1991 report conceded that implementation analysis 
remained underdeveloped, but virtually no recommendations were made about this topic. The 1993 
review of effects o f labour market policy measures refers to implementation research in rather 
implicit than overt terms, despite the fact that the results are pointing strongly to the need to address 
this issue.
Indeed there seem to be some hurdles to the further development o f in-depth implementation 
analysis which are not easy to overcome. One is that labour market policy evaluation is strongly 
influenced by economic concepts, whereas the questions o f implementation research are linked to 
other social science concepts and frequently require interdisciplinary approaches. In addition, the 
field does not have a set of distinct and well-rounded research questions that are awaiting the right 
answers. Large parts o f the work to be done are in fact "applied" and "descriptive" topics, which are 
labels partly considered as insults in the academic community. Secondly, a kind o f "cultural lag" 
may be observed, which is due to large differences in evaluation experience in different countries: 
in the beginning o f the evaluation practice, the questions of effects of actions were very appealing to 
policy makers and managers, and this is reinforced by the strong literature about this aspect. 
However, it may be rather unpleasant to allow evaluators to have a close look into the more intimate 
processes within institutions, which is inevitable for implementation analysis. If we take the US 
experience, which may be seen as paradigmatic for the development of the overall evaluation 
business, we can observe that the call for implementation analysis was reinforced at a rather late 
stage of development, when the shortcomings of mere impact analysis increasingly could not be
As an example w e may refer to a comprehensive report about the Austrian public employment service which 
presented some data that can be used as a basis for performance indicators. However this information is heavily 
objected to within the organization, and despite it had been published some years ago it is officially rather due to 
"inhibition" than taken as a point o f  departure for further action (cf. BMAS 1992).
22 This view is strongly reinforced by some experience in conducting a project about possibilities for evaluation 
in the Austrian employment service (cf. Lassnigg et al. 1994).
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overlooked. Without effort at counteraction this development may be repeated in other countries. 
Finally, we should take into account that an active labour market policy is a relatively young course 
of action, implemented in many countries not before the late sixties, or even later, and that this kind 
of action has not been undisputed. Therefore it is understandable that the question about impact 
came first. When in principle impact is positively established, the question about improvement 
arises.
However, as Richard Nathan (1991) pointed out convincingly, the notion o f putting impact 
evaluation before implementation evaluation may be misleading. He makes very strong points for 
an evaluation strategy within which implementation analysis should in any case precede impact 
analysis. This view is based both on analytical concepts and on empirical observations. In analytical 
terms it is argued that a sharp distinction should be drawn between measures which are newly set up 
on the one hand, and established ongoing measures on the other. Different kinds o f assessment, 
including different analytical questions and designs correspond to the different kinds o f measures, 
and this should be due mainly to the well-grounded expectation o f different behaviours of 
implementing bodies connected to each of the types of measures. In case o f newly established 
measures, it is expected that implementation will be rather in accord with the schedule, and the 
main evaluative question is for the impact, which is intended to occur; but because supposedly new 
ideas o f functioning are underlying the new action, it is unknown if  it will work. In addition this 
kind of measure should normally be small in scale, and therefore rather easily manageable. Nathan 
calls this kind o f assessment demonstration research, and supports the experimental paradigm as a 
useful design for this kind of research.23 However, in case o f ongoing programmes which are broad 
in scale and cover large institutions, two kinds of analytical questions are formulated, the first 
concerns how the implementing institution deals with the planned measure (impact of the measure 
011 the institution), and the second concerns the impact on participants in the measure (impact on 
individuals). According to the existing research, about implementation, the first aspect is considered 
to be the more important one, because o f the normally wide variations in implementing the planned 
measures that normally occur (which are frequently identified by a certain law or regulation, and the 
respective budget). "We need to think sequentially. Implementation/institutional research needs to 
precede the study o f  programme impact on individuals in evaluation research. We need to know 
what it is that may or may not cause the individual impacts we now want to measure." (Nathan 
1991, 25) Consequently, in many cases the second stage, assessment of individual impact, may be 
omitted.
This view which radically differs from the conventional view in labour market policy evaluation is 
strongly reinforced by the classical body of implementation research literature which mainly
23 It should be noted that the terms demonstration research or demonstration studies are not used always in the 
same way. Some authors use it rather in the meaning o f  pilot studies, sometimes implying a strategy similar to 
experiments but with less stringent methodological requirements. According to Nathan most o f  the well-known  
experimental studies fall in the category o f  demonstration research, which is in his view opposed to evaluation research.
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originated in the field o f political science, lending proof to the point that the planned schedules of 
programmes mostly are vague images o f the real action once the programme is implemented. This 
means that especially large scale programmes get their real shape not in the process o f formulation 
of the plan, but during the process of implementation which involves a rather large set of 
interplaying actors.24 As a striking illustration o f implementation problems we may look at the 
indications for the substitution bias which Heckman & Smith (1995, 106) reported on basis o f their 
reanalysis o f data from the JTPA-Evaluation. In this project which may be seen as a significant 
experimental study, "according to the self-reports o f  the treatment group members, however, only 
48 percent received treatment during this period. Meanwhile 32 percent o f  control group members 
self-reported receiving training from  other sources over the same interval." We have to bear in 
mind that the experimental evaluation results rest on the assumption that treatment in the former 
group was 100% whereas in the latter it should be 0%. The necessity to invest in implementation 
evaluation is obviously underlined by this result.
Another aspect which reinforces the case for in-depth implementation evaluation is the increasing 
acknowledgment o f the close interconnection between active labour market policy and the 
traditional services o f the employment service, which include information, counseling, vacancy 
filling, and also administration o f unemployment insurance payments. As it is frequently shown, in 
many countries reforms of the institutional frameworks of labour market policy are taking place, 
however these activities are not very strongly accompanied by evaluation research. Some recent 
studies point to the difficulties, and to the lack of expertise in the evaluation o f such a kind o f large
25and complex institutional frameworks. Additionally, we can observe that also in major reforms 
which were recently set in motion, the core idea of implementation research, that a reform is not 
completed but started by the amendment of a new law, is not taken seriously. As an example we 
may take the Austrian reform of the employment service, which was complemented by a large scale 
external assessment of the institution and also o f the reform proposals, but during implementation 
has not been supported by comparable evaluation activities. In-depth implementation evaluation 
would certainly improve knowledge about these overall structures.
In concluding the section about implementation evaluation we can easily see that this kind of 
evaluation activity has a close relationship to impact evaluation in at least two respects. First, 
appropriate structures of monitoring and performance indicators are a necessary precondition for 
impact studies — the best methodology to disentangle net effects is not worthwhile, if  the data used 
do not reflect the measures adequately. Second, in-depth implementation analysis often helps to 
understand the results o f impact analysis, and shows us ways how to improve the practices.
See as examples the classical implementation studies by Pressman & Wildavsky 1984, or Bardach 1982.
As examples see OECD (1989), or the report about the Austrian public employment service (BM AS 1992).
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d) Policy evaluation: How to Force the Political System to Make Clear Statements about Goals and 
Objectives?
In the category o f policy evaluation, we are principally confronted with the fundamental question, 
whether we as evaluators should charge the political system to change its practices significantly, or 
whether we rather should try to fit into the ongoing political practices in an informed and reasonable 
manner. The oft-stated request for clear statements of unambiguous goals and objectives from the 
political community, and the possibility to derive similar clear-cut outcome measures, may be a 
pious hope rather than as an operative challenge. Nevertheless we can take steps in this direction. 
In this way we have to acknowledge that in the overall field o f labour market policy there are 
conflicting interests involved, and will always be involved (OECD 1989, 28): one is the efficiency- 
equity trade-off, another is to which extent services should be allocated to either side o f the labour 
market, etc. Since the proposed new framework for labour market policies was endorsed by labour 
ministers in 1992, the role actually imposed to active measures o f labour market policy is an 
important question of policy evaluation.
In any case, the point for policy evaluation is that the formulation o f goals and objectives should be
"internalized" in the evaluation activity, and consequently this dimension should be made open for
informed discussion. An obvious and important aspect of policy evaluation, which frequently had
not been taken into account, is the analysis of reasonable expectations for an implemented measure:
26How large could the expected effects be?
Ex-ante evaluation, which reviews the action plans prior to their implementation, is a useful tool 
contributing to policy evaluation. Another tool of this kind is the examination o f  "evaluability” 
which was proposed by Joseph S.Wholey (1979). This kind of exercise has frequently proven to 
collect and transmit the desired information to program providers, so that it in fact could be used as 
a substitute for a full range evaluation project.
Concluding Remarks
As increasing resources are spent on activities in labour market policy, the evaluation of these 
activities is gaining interest in several countries. However, there are large differences concerning the 
experience in labour market policy evaluation. What can be learned from past experience?
We have stated at the outset, and as a conclusion from the general evaluation literature, that it would 
be appropriate to complement outcome-oriented impact analysis with a second route o f analysis,
This question is illustrated by Robert J.LaLonde (1995) in a recent review o f  training programmes.
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which may be termed "process oriented analysis”, with emphasis on the implementation o f policy 
measures. The mere observation of what works or what does not work should be complemented by 
the question why it works or does not.
If we refer to our short account of results, we can easily see that in most categories of measures, 
there is no simple answer to whether something works or does not work. Rather the outcome seems 
to depend on the specific nature o f measures, which highlights the close linkage o f impact and 
implementation. Moreover, our short comment about outcomes seems to indicate that broad 
categories of programmes, which cover both a widespread and various populations o f clients and a 
various collection of specific treatments, do not show positive results. This may be because of 
variability of outcomes, which was not very observable using the traditional methodology oriented 
to mean effects, or because the measures in themselves lack appropriate targeting to the specific 
problems of clients. Differentiation o f evaluation according to the various areas and categories 
described will be necessary; however, the more differentiated the practice o f evaluation will be, the 
more it will become difficult to gain an overview from an external standpoint. Therefore it seems to 
be inevitable in the long run that evaluation concerning all the mentioned categories will be brought 
to the actors which are themselves providing the policy measures at the "grassroots" level.
In taking steps to develop a comprehensive framework o f labour market policy evaluation a 
combination of external and internal evaluation procedures seems to be the best way to set up such a 
framework. In this case the chance is high that the drawbacks of both models can be overcome, 
using the strengths of each model. Internal evaluation procedures are able to bring the evaluation 
activities in pace with practical needs. In addition, the implementation of proper monitoring 
procedures as well as of performance indicators can only be performed by internal frameworks. 
These procedures seem in any case to be a precondition for the performance of external evaluation 
activities, providing necessary bases for information. External evaluation, especially when it is 
linked to the academic community, is able to transcend some limitations o f the views of insiders, 
and can also contribute to methodological improvements and ensure proper quality standards.
The different categories o f labour market policy evaluation ~  policy analysis, impact analysis, and 
implementation analysis -- should be taken seriously. Priority should be given especially to the 
development of implementation analysis: setting up sound monitoring systems and performance 
indicators must be considered as very important steps. Implementation evaluation has a close 
relationship to impact evaluation because appropriate structures of monitoring and performance 
indicators are a necessary precondition for impact studies: the best methodology to disentangle net 
effects is not worthwhile, if  the data used do not reflect the measures adequately. Concerning 
impact evaluation the problems involved in the experimental methodology should be taken 
seriously into account. Investment in nonexperimental evaluation should be provided because of its
27
applicability, and because there may also be a way to better combine nonexperimental impact 
evaluation with the other categories o f evaluation, especially with implementation issues.
As a final conclusion we may argue, that there is a movement in the field o f labour market policy 
evaluation going on which follows two joint directions:
— One is a broadening of the focus from programmes to institutions,
-  and the second is the movement from the narrow external black-box impact evaluation to the 
setting up o f broad frameworks o f self-evaluation, assisted in certain points by external services. 
This development may be seen as a process o f differentiation and enrichment, which has the figure 
o f blowing into a balloon and seeing how it grows to its full beauty and magnitude ~  however, we 
should blow not too sharp, because in this case ... you know what I mean.
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